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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
With the joint written consent of the parties filed
with the Clerk of the Court, CHILD USA, the National
Center for Victims of Crime, the National Crime Victim
Law Institute, the National Organization for Victim
Assistance, and Arizona Voice for Crime Victims respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.1
------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus curiae, CHILD USA, a Philadelphiabased nonprofit think tank, draws on the combined
expertise of the nation’s leading medical and legal academics to reach evidence-based solutions to persistent and widespread problems involving child
protection. All child victims deserve justice, and
CHILD USA aims to find the path for them.
The National Center for Victims of Crime
(“NCVC”), a Virginia-based nonprofit organization, is
the nation’s leading resource and advocacy organization for all victims of crime. NCVC is particularly interested in this brief because of its commitment to
victims of sexual assault and child abuse.

1

Counsel for amici curiae authored this brief in whole and
no other person or entity other than amici or their counsel has
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. Counsel for both parties were given ten days notice
and both parties consented to the filing of this brief.

2
The National Crime Victim Law Institute
(“NCVLI”) is a nonprofit educational and advocacy organization located at Lewis and Clark Law School in
Portland, Oregon. NCVLI promotes balance and fairness in the justice system through crime victimcentered legal advocacy, education, and resource sharing.
The National Organization for Victim Assistance (“NOVA”) is a nonprofit organization of victim
and witness assistance programs, practitioners, agencies, researchers, victims, professionals, and others
committed to the recognition and implementation of
victim rights and services.
Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (“AVCV”)
is an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to promote and protect crime victims’ interests throughout
the criminal justice process.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Until recently, many states have had child sex
abuse statutes of limitation that have made it difficult
for prosecution to occur. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Justice Denied: What America Must Do to Protect
Its Children (2012). Victims are cruelly shut out from
the system of justice through a combination of the effects of trauma, the power differential with the perpetrator, and a legal system inadequate to the task.
In Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), this
Court addressed California’s attempt to resolve the

3
injustice by reviving expired criminal statutes of limitations in all cases of child sex abuse. In a 5-4 decision,
this Court held that the California law violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Id. at 633. For a narrow majority of
the Court, the blanket revival of criminal claims went
too far.
Since Stogner, the science of DNA evidence in sex
assault cases has become increasingly sophisticated
and reliable and states have begun to enact laws to
permit prosecution of child rape where conclusive
DNA evidence becomes available. See DNA Provisions—Fifty State Survey, CHILD USA, (Oct. 2018),
www.childusa.org/dnaprovisions. This deeply reliable
evidence justifies the reopening of a child sexual abuse
case even when the statute of limitations previously
expired, because it does not raise the risk of unfairness
to the perpetrator. It is also necessary to prevent further abuse by the now-identified perpetrator.
In this case, eight-year-old L.T. was raped in
her home in the middle of the night. Evidence was
gathered immediately. The wrong man served a decade
in prison due to a false conviction. It is now possible,
due to a later-discovered DNA match with the actual
perpetrator, to hold the right man accountable. This
case is a proper vehicle for this Court to consider
the appropriate interpretation and limits of Stogner v.
California. By permitting prosecution of child abuse
perpetrators, this Court would not only be providing
particular victims access to much-needed justice, but
would also be aiding in the incarceration of dangerous
sexual predators before they could abuse more
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children. Nothing in the Constitution forbids these
laudable conclusions.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
On March 20, 1987, eight-year-old L.T. was
raped—orally, vaginally, and anally—in the middle of
the night in her home in Billings, Montana. She and
her family immediately reported the crime to the
police. Police collected physical evidence of the rapist’s
semen from her. This DNA evidence was preserved.
Based on circumstantial evidence, Jimmy Ray
Bromgard was falsely convicted of the crime and was
incarcerated for over a decade.
In 2014, under the terms of a guilty plea for felony
drug possession, Montana collected Ronald Tipton’s
DNA. Utilizing the Combined DNA Index System, or
CODIS, police conclusively linked Tipton’s DNA to the
semen on file from L.T.’s rape. The State of Montana
then sought to prosecute Tipton for his rape of L.T.
Overruling a detailed decision from the trial court (Pet.
App. 21-50), the Montana Supreme Court concluded
that his prosecution was barred as a violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause, as interpreted in this Court’s opinion in Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). The
Montana Supreme Court took no pleasure in letting
Mr. Tipton walk free, explaining that “[t]he crime
against L.T. . . . was, and remains, a horrific, morally
repugnant act that the people of Montana expect will
be punished for the protection of the victim and society.
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The State’s case against the alleged perpetrator is
strong, and the scientific evidence is compelling.” Pet.
App. at 19.
Amici curiae urge this Court to grant certiorari so
that it can examine whether Stogner is distinguishable
from this case. Because Stogner is either distinguishable from the facts here—or should be reconsidered in
circumstances involving newly-discovered DNA evidence—this Court should allow Mr. Tipton’s prosecution for L.T.’s rape to go forward.
I.

THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR
CHILD SEX ABUSE SHOULD BE GUIDED
BY THE SCIENCE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT, WHICH SUPPORTS MONTANA’S
LAW PERMITTING REVIVAL OF EXPIRED
CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
WHEN DNA EVIDENCE IS PRESENT.

The lack of prosecution in this case echoes an alltoo-common story, where justice for child victims of
rape is rarely achieved. The problems are manifold.
Although this case involves a child reporting almost
immediately, in many cases victims are unable to come
forward for decades. In virtually all cases, the crime
occurs in secret, making corroboration difficult. These
problems play into the danger for children posed by
perpetrators. Child molesters often abuse their victims
for years, leaving numerous victims in their wake over
the course of a lifetime. This reality makes it all the
more necessary that sexual assault cases be prosecuted whenever possible.

6
Child sex abuse is a global and national scourge
that has flourished in, among other places, youthserving organizations and families. On average, one in
four girls and one in six boys are sexually abused.2
Most abuse occurs at the hands of those who are in the
family or closely associated with the victim. This case
involves the rare instance where abuse was perpetrated by a stranger, but even here the perpetrator was
someone from the community.
The adverse affects of childhood trauma are
indisputable. As explained by the Center for Disease
Control (“CDC”), Adverse Childhood Experiences
(“ACEs”) “have a tremendous impact on future violence
victimization and perpetration, and lifelong health and
opportunity.” U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Services,
CDC, About Adverse Childhood Experiences, https://www.
cdc.gov/violenceprevention/acestudy/about_ace.html (Apr.
1, 2016).3 The ACE Study is one of the largest
2

NSOPW, Raising Awareness About Sexual Abuse: Facts
and Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, https://www.nsopw.gov/enUS/Education/FactsStatistics?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=
1#reference (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); see also CDC, Preventing
Child Abuse & Neglect Fact Sheet, https://www.cdc.gov/violence
prevention/pdf/CAN-factsheet.pdf (2017) (noting that at least one
in seven children experienced abuse or neglect within the past
year—a likely underestimate). Other studies have placed the incidence of sexual abuse of boys as low as 1 in 20, but the 20-25%
figure for the abuse of girls has remained constant. See National
Center for Victims of Crime, Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, NCVC,
http://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/
child-sexual-abuse-statistics (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
3
Vincent J. Feletti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse
and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of
Death in Adults, 14 Am. J. Preventative Med. 4, 245-58 (1998);
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investigations of the effects of childhood abuse, definitively showing a strong correlation between Adverse
Childhood Experiences and later impairments.4 Robert
F. Anda et al., The Enduring Effects of Abuse and
Related Adverse Experiences in Childhood, 256 EUR.
ARCH PSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCIE. 174, 175 (Nov.
2005) (“Numerous studies have established that childhood stressors such as abuse or witnessing domestic
violence can lead to a variety of negative health outcomes and behaviors, such as substance abuse, suicide
attempts, and depressive disorders.”).
Trauma affects childhood victims of sexual abuse
or assault in a way that is distinct from victims of other
crimes. Frequently children are so disabled by the
trauma that they cannot disclose the abuse until much
later in life. As a direct result of the shame and secrecy
historically associated with child sex abuse, victims often remain in the shadows—unable to come forward.
See, e.g., Judy Cashmore et al., The Characteristics of
Reports to the Police of Child Sexual Abuse and the
Likelihood of Cases Proceeding to Prosecution after
S.R. Dube et al., Childhood Abuse, Household Dysfunction, and
the Risk of Attempted Suicide Throughout the Life Span: Findings
from the Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, 286 JAMA 24,
3089-96 (Dec. 2001) (explaining that childhood trauma can lead
to negative health outcomes).
4
The findings from the ACE study show a strong graded
relationship between adverse childhood experiences and related
impairments (e.g., disrupted neurodevelopment; social, emotional,
and cognitive impairment; disease; disability; etc.). See, e.g., Feletti,
supra note 3; U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Services, CDC, Adverse
Childhood Experiences (ACEs), https://www.cdc.gov/violence
prevention/acestudy/index.html (Apr. 2016).

8
Delays in Reporting, 74 INTL. J. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
49, 49-61 (2017) (explaining that delays in disclosing
and reporting child sexual abuse to the police are common); Katie Wright et al., The Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual
Abuse, 74 INTL. J. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1, 4 (2017)
(suggesting that on average it took victims over twenty
years to disclose their abuse). At least thirty-three percent of such cases are never reported. See id.; see also
Mary-Ellen Pipe et al., Child Sexual Abuse: Disclosure,
Delay, and Denial 32 (2013) (“failure to disclose is common among sexually abused children.”).
When a report is made, many other barriers to
successful prosecution often exist. These problems create ample opportunities for perpetrators.5 After abuse
is reported, “[a]dults tend to protect other adults and
the reputation of institutions—even when it comes to
an issue as serious as child sexual abuse.” Marci A.
Hamilton, The Barriers to a National Inquiry into
Child Sexual Abuse in the United States, 74 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 107, 107 (2017). As a consequence,
sexual assault cases are regularly dismissed against
perpetrators or never brought in the first place due to
5

See generally BESSEL VAN DER KOLK, THE BODY KEEPS THE
SCORE: BRAIN MIND AND BODY IN THE HEALING OF TRAUMA
(2014); Penelope K. Trickett et al., The Impact of Sexual Abuse on
Female Development: Lessons from a Multigenerational, Longitudinal Research Study, 23 DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY,
453-76 (2011); S. Berkowitz et al., The Child and Family Traumatic Stress Intervention: Secondary Prevention for Youth at Risk
Youth of Developing PTSD, 52 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. PSYCHIATRY
676, 676-85 (Jun. 2011).

9
the trauma effects, the difficulty of proof, and the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Yonat Shimron, Judge Dismisses Sexual Assault Claims Against Southern
Baptist Leader, RELIGION NEWS, Oct. 18, 2018; Deanna
Paul, Utah Refused to Prosecute Four Sexual Assault
Cases, so the Alleged Victims Set Out to Do It Themselves, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2018.
In light of this research, the Court should consider
Montana’s petition against the backdrop of the harmful consequences whenever a child sexual assault
crime is not prosecuted.
II.

DNA EVIDENCE CAN BOTH CONVICT THE
GUILTY AND SPARE THE INNOCENT OF A
FALSE CONVICTION, AS WOULD HAPPEN
IN THIS CASE IF THE COURT REVERSES
THE DECISION BELOW.

In considering effective prosecution of sexual assault cases, the development of DNA evidence offers a
unique remedy. For many cases (such as this one), DNA
evidence offers a solution to ensure that the guilty are
punished while the innocent are not harmed.
DNA was first used in a 1987 criminal case in Florida, to prove Tommie Lee Andrews guilty of rape.6 DNA
evidence matched Andrews’ DNA to the crime’s physical evidence. Jeffrey Lee Ashton, Foundation for DNA
Fingerprint Evidence, 8 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d
6

It has been approved by the Montana Supreme Court for
use in the State since 1994. Montana v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457
(Mont. 1994).
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740, § 2 (2018). In the Andrews case (as in many others), DNA evidence made it possible to “determine
identity to a virtual certainty.” Id. at § 4.
This Court underscored the importance and certainty of DNA evidence in Maryland v. King, 569 U.S.
435 (2013). In that case, this Court recognized that
criminals use name, appearance, and other changes to
conceal themselves from the police. Id. at 443. They
may carry false IDs and their criminal records may be
inaccurate. Id. In such difficult circumstances, DNA
provides “unparalleled accuracy” in identification to
help the police do their job and achieve justice for
crime victims. Id. at 450; see also National Research
Council of the National Academies, Strengthening
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward
130 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
228091.pdf (explaining that DNA typing is “universally recognized as the standard [against which other
techniques are judged . . . ] because of its reliability.”).
In King, this Court raised a theoretical concern
about what actually happened in this case, where the
innocent Mr. Bromgard was imprisoned while the
guilty Mr. Tipton remained free. Often, the Court explained, when DNA evidence is not used, criminals are
not arrested and instead are left free to commit additional crimes. Id. at 453.
King also noted the importance of DNA evidence
to victims, pointing out the dangers of a criminal aware
of DNA: “For example, a defendant who had committed
a prior sexual assault might be inclined to flee on a

11
burglary charge, knowing that in every State a DNA
sample would be taken from him after his conviction
on the burglary charge that would tie him to the more
serious charge of rape.” Id. at 456. Victims remain at
risk whenever a person guilty of sexual assault remains free. Indeed, in one study of what happened
when a person was wrongfully convicted of a sexual assault, actual offenders who were not arrested for their
crimes committed numerous additional crimes. James
R. Acker, The Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convictions: When the Guilty Go Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629,
1632 (2013).
Public confidence in the justice system drops
dramatically when the innocent are convicted while
the guilty go free. Using DNA evidence properly can
rebuild confidence in the system and contribute to
greater protection for children. For that reason, the
“most ardent law enforcement enthusiasts and the
most passionate civil libertarians should have no
disagreement about the desirability of disabling repeat
violent offenders from claiming new victims, or of sparing innocent parties the pains and injustice of wrongful conviction and punishment.” Id. at 1711.
Bringing sexual assault offenders to justice is
uniquely important in the criminal justice system.
The Australian Royal Commission into Institutional
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (“Australian Royal
Commission”), frequently lauded as the gold standard
of national investigations into childhood sexual abuse,
emphasizes the importance of testimonial-based
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inquiry.7 In a report derived from hearings by the
Commission, Professor Shurlee Swain explains that
through listening to testimony from victims and survivors, “the wrongdoing is recognized, victims are repositioned as moral equals, and their right to harbor
feelings of anger and resentment is acknowledged.”
Shurlee Swain, History of Australian Inquiries Reviewing Institutions Providing Care for Children, 10 (2014).
DNA is the investigative tool that cuts through perpetrators’ ready-made false defenses.
By listening to victims, we also learn to recognize
manipulative behaviors relied on by predators.
DARVO, or Deny, Attack, and Reverse Victim and
Offender, is a scientific term regularly used by sexual
assault experts to describe common patterns of offender behavior.8 The strategy is simple: to gain sympathy by claiming to be the true victim, thereby
derailing any investigation into the allegations.9
7

Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child
Sexual Abuse, Commonwealth of Australia (2017), https://www.
childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/final-report/.
8
See Jennifer Freyd Ph.D., Violations of Power, Adaptive
Blindness & Betrayal Trauma Theory, 7 J. FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY 22 (1997) (explaining the DARVO strategy employed by perpetrators as silencing victims to escape culpability, minimizing or
denying the abuse, attacking the victim’s credibility, and playing
the victim themselves).
9
Sarah J. Harsey et al., Perpetrator Responses to Victim Confrontation: DARVO and Victim Self-Blame, 26:6 J. AGGRESSION,
MALTREATMENT, & TRAUMA, 644, 644-63 (2017) (showing that DARVO
“was commonly experienced by individuals who confronted
another [ ] over a wide variety of wrong-doings . . . [and] that
DARVO exposure was related to the . . . participants’ negative
emotions felt about the confrontation when it occurred”).
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Forceful denials of guilt are textbook for perpetrators
of abuse and remain an effective tool for perpetrators
to “assume[ ] the role of ‘falsely accused’ and attack[ ]
the accuser’s credibility” thus blaming “the accuser
of being the perpetrator of a false accusation.” Jennifer
Freyd, Ph.D., Research—DARVO, https://www.jjfreyd.
com/research. DARVO poses additional problems for
fact-finders because of the way that guilty perpetrators
react—shifting blame.
In cases where DNA evidence is available, providing clear scientific proof linking an individual to a
crime against a child, an arbitrary procedural deadline
should not be permitted to trump science to prevent
holding child predators accountable. This countervailing interest in protecting children is a compelling interest of the highest order. Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1740 (2017). It is also a matter of fundamental fairness. DNA evidence is admissible to reverse a conviction: defendants are permitted to
assert it as a shield against false convictions. See generally National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward (2009), supra. If a convicted defendant can re-open a conviction upon the discovery of
new DNA evidence, fairness demands that a victim
should be able to invoke DNA evidence to reopen the
possibility of criminal prosecution for sexual abuse.
Here, reliable DNA evidence links Tipton to the
rape of L.T. The Court should grant the petition to determine whether its prior precedents truly require the
affront to justice that would come for ignoring a
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clearly-established scientific link showing who was responsible for this truly heinous crime.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE
IMPORTANT AND RECURRING ISSUE OF
WHETHER ALLOWING PROSECUTION IN
CASES WITH NEWLY DISCOVERED DNA
EVIDENCE VIOLATES THE EX POST
FACTO CLAUSE.
Montana’s petition asks this Court to review the
decision below, which refused to allow application of
Montana’s duly enacted law allowing for an extension
of the statute of limitations based on newly-discovered
DNA evidence. This law was designed to bring justice
to victims of past sex offenses and to prevent future
victimization of other victims. This Court should grant
certiorari on this recurring question, which is of crucial
importance to child sexual assault victims.
The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids any state from
passing “any . . . ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1. As its language suggests—and as this Court
has recognized for more than 200 years—the prohibition is restricted to criminal cases such as this one. See
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). In Stogner v. California, 593 U.S. 607 (2003), this Court applied the Ex
Post Facto Clause and held unconstitutional a California law that broadly permitted “resurrection of otherwise time-barred criminal prosecutions, and . . . was
itself enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had
expired.” Id. at 609.
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In this case, four years after Stogner, Montana
enacted a much narrower law, focusing specifically on
situations involving new and conclusive DNA testing:
“If a suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing
after a time period prescribed in subsection (1)(b) or
(1)(c) has expired, a prosecution may be commenced
within 1 year after the suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing.” Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205(9).
No doubt, the Montana legislature thought it was
complying with federal constitutional limits. Montana’s law fits within a broad national pattern of comparable legislation. More than half the states have now
enacted DNA-triggered criminal child sex abuse statutes of limitation in some form or another.10 As the national CODIS database has expanded, “cold hits” like
the one in this case have increasingly allowed law enforcement to identify criminals who have committed
sex offenses.
In its decision below, the Montana Supreme Court
interpreted Stogner overbroadly to conclude that it
could not apply Montana’s statute to this case. The
Court appeared reluctant to do so, noting that “[t]he
State’s case against the alleged perpetrator is strong,
and the scientific evidence is compelling.” Pet. App. 18.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that it was bound to
follow Stogner: “Stogner compels us to hold that the
charges against Tipton must be dismissed.” Id.

10

See DNA Provisions—Fifty State Survey, CHILD USA,
(Oct. 2018), www.childusa.org/dnaprovisions.
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Before this remarkable failure of justice is allowed
to occur—both in the case at hand and other similar
ones that will inevitably follow—this Court should review the decision below. The Court below erred by failing to distinguish the California one-size-fits-all child
sex abuse statute from Montana’s tailored law that
protects the innocent by permitting later prosecution
only where there is conclusive DNA evidence. This
Court should grant certiorari to either clarify that
Stogner does not preclude States from enacting the
kind of narrowly drawn statute at issue here or overrule Stogner to permit application of such statutes in
circumstances such as this case.
A. Montana’s Narrow DNA Statute Allowing
Revival of Claims for a Limited Period of
Time is Distinguishable from the Broad
Statute at Issue in Stogner.
When the Montana Supreme Court interpreted
Stogner, it attempted to apply the Ex Post Facto principles explained by this Court. The Court below stated
that the “Clause protects liberty by prohibiting statutes with manifestly unjust and oppressive retroactive
effects.” Pet. App. at 9. The Clause prevents “unfair and
dishonest” legislation that deprives people of “fair
warning” that they may be subject to prosecution and
that they need to preserve evidence of their innocence.
Id. at 13. It thus protects against “arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Id. (citing Stogner, 539
U.S. at 611). Allowing Montana’s DNA law to be applied in this case does none of these things. It does not
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manifest unjust and oppressive retroactive effects, deprive people of fair warning, or apply arbitrarily and
vindictively. To the contrary, the law based on conclusive DNA evidence cuts through all these concerns.
At its core, an ex post facto law is a law which, in
its operation, makes criminal an act which was not so
when it was performed, which increases the punishment for such an act, or which, relative to the act,
changes the position of a party to his or her disadvantage. In Stogner v. California, this Court acknowledged that all discussions of ex post facto laws return
to Justice Chase’s definition in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386 (1798), a case that “this Court has recognized as
providing an authoritative account of the scope of the
Ex Post Facto Clause.” Stogner, 539 U.S. at 611. In
Stogner, the majority and the dissent debated the
meanings of Chase’s definitions and disagreed about
their application to the California statute that resurrected time-barred criminal prosecutions for all child
sex abuse cases. Ultimately, Stogner hinged on the second category offered by Justice Chase, which was that
ex post facto laws included “[e]very law that aggravates
a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390–91 (emphasis added). The
Stogner majority concluded that this category included
California’s broad law. 539 U.S. at 620-21. The dissent
disagreed. Id. at 639-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
But whatever the competing merits of these respective positions in that case (a subject discussed below), this case stands on different factual footing.
These differences were clearly explained by the trial
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court, which compared the statute at issue in Stogner
with the statute at issue here:
Stogner, decided in 2003, was based on a California statute that resurrected old sex
crimes. The California statute was originally
amended in 1993 and specifically dealt with
delayed reporting by alleged victims, usually
family members. Stogner never mentioned
DNA evidence in relation to the statute of limitation nor did it address any amendment to a
statute of limitation dealing directly with
DNA evidence like the 2007 DNA amendment
to Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205. This is a key
difference between the 1993 California statute and the 2007 Montana amendment.
Pet. App. at 42-43. The trial court carefully analyzed
why Stogner did not prevent application of the Montana provision. The trial court explained that “[t]he
Montana legislature, unlike California’s legislature in
Stogner, did not allow for the revival of any and all previous causes of actions that would have been time
barred under a statute of limitation.” Id. at 46. Instead,
Montana had revived a very limited class of cases:
DNA cases. As the court explained, “This DNA law differs completely from the law reviving all causes of actions in Stogner—Montana’s law is highly specific and
requires a conclusive DNA match before prosecution
can occur.” Id. at 47. As an additional safeguard
against ex post facto concerns, the trial court noted
“the 2007 amendment restricts the time the State has
to initiate prosecution to one year.” Id.
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The trial court further explored possible prejudice
to Mr. Tipton from application of the new law, finding
none. The trial court explained that “Mr. Tipton has not
been deprived of any defense available under the law
at the time the act was committed.” Id. at 47. Moreover,
while Stogner “discussed lack of evidence and concerns
about problems with the memories of witnesses” in
cases that were revived, in this case “DNA and its scientific validation” provided conclusive evidence and
“[t]he law enforcement records and witness statements
from March of 1987 have been maintained.” Id.
The trial court also discussed particular facts “distinguish[ing] this case from Stogner and highlight[ing]
the manifest injustice which would result” if the 2007
amendment were not allowed to apply. Id. at 48. First,
the victim and the State “believed her perpetrator was
behind bars from 1988 through 2002.” As a result, neither the victim nor the police were looking for another
suspect during that time—meaning the case went cold,
even after the original suspect was released. Id.
Second, Mr. Tipton’s decision to commit an additional crime led to the discovery that he had perpetrated the crime. In 2014, Tipton was convicted of the
felony of Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Id.
As a result of that conviction, Tipton had to provide a
DNA sample to be kept in the CODIS database. As the
trial court explained, “But for Mr. Tipton’s new criminal conduct the State may never have located him and
L.T.’s case would have remained cold.” Id. at 49.
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In light of all these circumstances, the trial court
found that this Court’s decision in Stogner did not control. As the trial court explained, “It is hard to believe
these facts are the type contemplated by the Stogner
Court as it addressed the California law allowing resurrection of any and all previous rapes having been
time barred. These facts are wholly different from the
Stogner facts.” Id. at 49. The trial court’s ultimate conclusion: “Fairness dictates this matter proceed to trial.”
Id.
It is true, of course, that the trial court’s conclusion
can be disputed. For example, the Montana Supreme
Court disagreed, believing its hands were tied because
Stogner “leaves no room to balance the State’s and the
victim’s interests against the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from ex post facto laws.” Id. at 17.
This very disagreement reveals the existence of serious arguments about the scope and reach of Stogner—
arguments that this Court should fully consider by
granting certiorari before a terrible injustice is allowed
to occur in this and similar cases.
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B. To the Extent that Dicta in Stogner Require Holding that Application of the
Montana Law is Barred by the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Court Should Consider Overruling that Dicta as Applied
to DNA-Triggered Child Sex Abuse
Statutes of Limitations.
Even if this Court were to read dicta in Stogner as
preventing application of Montana’s DNA law in this
case—and by implication similar DNA-triggered statutes in many other states—the Court should still grant
certiorari and reconsider that particular aspect of
Stogner, overruling Stogner to permit justice here and
in other comparable cases. This Court has not hesitated to overrule other decisions that have prevented
justice for crime victims. Most notably, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), this Court overruled two
earlier decisions barring the use of victim impact statements in capital cases. This Court explained that those
decisions “were decided by the narrowest of margins,
over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions.” Id. at 828-29.
Of course, exactly the same can be said here. Justice Kennedy’s “spirited” dissent (joined by three other
justices) challenged the “basic underpinnings” of
Stogner. Justice Kennedy explained that the Court’s
decision “disregards the interests of those victims of
child abuse who have found the courage to face their
abusers and bring them to justice. The Court’s opinion
harms not only our ex post facto jurisprudence but also
these and future victims of child abuse, and so compels
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my respectful dissent.” Stogner, 539 U.S. at 653 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In Payne, the Court was also concerned that “[j]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till
it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 827); see also id. at 833 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting the “injustice of requiring the
exclusion of relevant aggravating evidence during capital sentencing, while requiring the admission of all
relevant mitigating evidence”). In an effort to “keep the
balance true,” Payne overruled an evidentiary limitation in a criminal prosecution that was already moving
forward. In this case, however, the injustice is far more
serious than a mere debate over what evidence can be
admitted. If Stogner is allowed to block application of
Montana’s law (and many similar DNA provisions in
other states), justice will be entirely denied for L.T. and
others who have been the victims of child sex abuse in
similar circumstances. The scales of justice will have
tipped entirely towards child sexual abusers who can
succeed in running out the clock.
Justice Kennedy presciently warned of such dangers in his dissent in Stogner. He noted the importance
of extending statutes of limitations in cases such as
this one, because “young victims often delay reporting
sexual abuse because they are easily manipulated by
offenders in positions of authority and trust, and because children have difficulty remembering the crime
or facing the trauma it can cause.” Stogner, 539 U.S. at
650 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy also addressed whether child sex
abusers had any sort of “reliance” interest that would
somehow be disrupted by extending statutes of limitations. Justice Kennedy powerfully dismissed such concerns, explaining (with supporting studies) that
“[w]hen a child molester commits his offense, he is well
aware the harm will plague the victim for a lifetime.”
Stogner, 539 U.S. at 651 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy wrote eloquently of the pain of
children who have been sexually victimized, who have
suffered “deep and lasting hurt.” 539 U.S. at 652 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Against that backdrop of suffering, the “only poor remedy is that the law will show its
compassion and concern when the victim at last can
find the strength, and know the necessity, to come forward. When the criminal has taken distinct advantage
of the tender years and perilous position of a fearful
victim, it is the victim’s lasting hurt, not the perpetrator’s fictional reliance, that the law should count the
higher.” Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy expressed grave concern about
the outcome in Stogner, noting that child sexual abuse
victims “have reported the crimes so that the violators
are brought to justice and harm to others is prevented.
The Court now tells the victims their decision to come
forward is in vain.” Id. at 651-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In this case, L.T. has come forward—seeking justice for herself and to prevent others from suffering as
she has. This Court should, at least, grant the petition
for certiorari to evaluate whether DNA-triggered statutes present a new circumstance that Stogner did not
have the opportunity to evaluate.
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The science is clear as to why so few child predators are prosecuted. Child victims of sexual abuse often
delay reporting as a result of the trauma associated.11
Indeed, the average age of reporting is 52. One-third of
victims never disclose their abuse.12 The barriers to
disclosure are compounded by the defendants’ tactics
to deny culpability, e.g., the approach whereby abusers
deny, attack, and try to reverse the roles of victim and
aggressor. When a child victim is able to report immediately and DNA can be gathered and preserved, proving conclusively who has committed a terrible crime,
nothing in the Constitution prevents Montana and
other states from deciding that they want to make justice possible. Indeed, this Court has quite recently recognized that “protecting children from abuse is a
compelling state interest.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1740 (2017).
The fact that Montana (and many other states)
have enacted DNA-triggered statutes permitting
prosecutions in cases such as this one, even after
Stogner, suggests ex post facto prohibitions are not
commonly understood in the same wooden fashion as
Stogner appears to have understood them. In similar
circumstances, “when this Court has confronted a
wrongly decided, unworkable precedent calling for
11

See, e.g., S. Berkowitz et al., The Child and Family Traumatic Stress Intervention: Secondary Prevention for Youth at Risk
Youth of Developing PTSD, 52 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. PSYCHIATRY,
676-85 (Jun. 2011).
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CHILD USA, Average and Median Age of CSA Disclosure,
(2018), www.childusa.org/law.
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some further action by the Court, we have chosen not
to compound the original error, but to overrule the
precedent.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 842-43 (Souter, J., concurring). The Court should do that same thing here.
By granting certiorari and overturning the decision below, this Court can permit Montana prosecutors
to try to respond to the “deep and lasting hurt” that
L.T. faced when she was raped at eight years old. Sadly,
the interests at stake in this case extend far beyond
L.T. They include many other children who will not see
justice if DNA-triggered statutes involving sexual
predators whose guilt can be conclusively proven are
not allowed to operate. Indeed, at a fundamental level,
what is at stake is whether to leave unreviewed a “decision contrary to the public sense of justice,” which
will inevitably “operate[ ] . . . to diminish respect for
the courts and for law itself.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 834
(Scalia, J., concurring).
The Court below explained that “[t]he crime
against L.T. more than thirty years ago was, and
remains, a horrific, morally repugnant act that the
people of Montana expect will be punished for the protection of the victim and society.” Pet. App. at 19. And
yet the Court reluctantly concluded that Stogner required it to let Mr. Tipton walk free. This Court should
review that decision, as justice will not be served if the
decision below is allowed to stand. This Court should
not interpret the Constitution to require such manifest
injustice.
------------------------------------------------------------------

26
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant certiorari, reverse the decision below, and permit Montana’s and other states’
laws to extend child sex abuse statutes of limitations
based on later-identified DNA evidence.
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